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ADOPTIONS BY LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS MUST BE
RECOGNIZED BY SISTER-STATES
UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE DESPITE
ANTI-MARRIAGE STATUTES
THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST SAME-SEX COUPLES
BARBARAJ. Cox*
I. INTRODUCTION
I come to the question of interstate recognition of adoptions by gay men
and lesbians from perhaps a slightly different place than some speakers at this
symposium. In 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme Court released its decision in
Baehr v. Lewin,' I became intrigued with the question of whether lesbian and
gay couples could go to Hawaii, get married, return home, and have their
marriages recognized. One of the reasons I became interested in this question
was because my parents and both of my sisters were married in a state different
than the one where they now live.
Like many people and countless newspapers, I originally assumed that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution 2 would control
this question. But upon researching it, I discovered that the U.S. Supreme
Court has not used the Full Faith and Credit Clause when discussing marriage
(which it has not done very often) and neither have most state courts.
Although the argument can and has been made that marriage recognition
should be controlled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause since the Clause
applies on its face to the "acts" (or statutes) of the various states,3 the primary
Copyright © 2003, Barbara J. Cox
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. I want to thank Professors
Mark Strasser, Capital University Law School; Lynn Wardle, Brigham Young University Law
School; and Kent Markus, Dave Thomas Center for Adoption Law, Capital University Law
School, for inviting me to participate in this symposium; and Jessica Poprocki, Capital
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write this article. I would also like to thank my partner, Peg Habetler, and her nonbiological
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importance of lesbian and gay parenting.
1 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
3 See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REv. 1, 14 (1997) [hereinafter Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA]
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focus has been on the area of conflicts of law. Under most conflict of law
theories, marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere, although a
public policy exception does permit courts to refuse to recognize marriages
that would violate the forum state's internal policies.
Unlike marriages, however, the question of interstate recognition of
judgments does fall within the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Supreme
Court has held that every state must give judgments from other states "the
same credit, validity, and effect" that would be given to the judgment in the
state that rendered it. Thus, a valid, final adoption decree 6 rendered in one
state establishing a parent-child relationship between the adoptive parent(s)
and the adoptive child(ren) must be recognized in every other state as equally
valid as an adoption decree rendered in that other state. Differences between
the states on local public policy, significant in whether one state will recognize
the statutes of another state, do not provide exceptions to the constitutional
command to recognize a sister state's valid, final judgments.
But for the discriminatory anti-marriage recognition statutes that
Congressg and thirty-six states have passed,9 the question of interstate
recognition of the adoptions by lesbian and gay parents would be
(citing Evan Wolfson's memorandum, Winning and Keeping Marriage Rights: What Will
Follow Victory in Baehr v. Lewin? (Feb., 16, 1996), which was given to Congress while it was
considering the Act).
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1942) (Williams I).
6 The reference to a "valid, final" judgment recognizes that judgments that are not
valid or final may be appealed or collaterally attacked in a second court. For a discussion of
collateral attacks, see infra Part III.B; See also Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction,
and Judgment Issues in Interstate Adoption Cases, at Part III.B.
7 See id.
8 Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), known as "the Defense of
Marriage Act" or DOMA, added 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2001) which reads:
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding
of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim
arising from such relationship.
Section 3(a) amended 1 U.S.C. § 7 by limiting the terms "marriage" to "a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife" and "spouse" to "a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife," in any U.S. Congressional act or regulation. Only § 1738C is at
issue in this discussion.
9 See Specific Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Laws in the U.S., at http://www.ngltf.org/
downloads/marriagemap0601.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
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unremarkable. It would be unremarkable due to the obvious requirement for
one state, established by the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court precedent,
to recognize another state's judgments. Even with anti-marriage statutes on
the books, courts have recognized the adoptions by parents in same-sex
relationships, despite statutes that deny equal marriage rights to those
couples.' ° The question becomes somewhat less clear, however, when the
adoption is based on the underlying relationship of a same-sex couple which
has had their relationship legally recognized in the state granting the adoption.
When the adoption at issue is based on a same-sex relationship recognized in
one state, and another state's anti-marriage statute specifically declares that the
second state will not recognize any "right or claim arising from such
relationshi?," 11 does the court in the second state still have to recognize the
adoption?' Let me use a hypothetical to raise the question explicitly, a
question that the rest of this article seeks to resolve.
Suppose that Ellen and Laurie live in California where they have
registered with the State of California as domestic partners.' 3 One of the
benefits of registering as domestic partners is that the couple becomes eligible
for step-parent adoptions, a right that previously had been limited to married
couples. 4 Five years earlier, Ellen and Laurie had decided to become parents
and raise children together. Ellen was artificially inseminated 5 and gave birth
10 See infra Part IV.
I This is the language used in DOMA. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
12 Professor Mark Strasser discussed a similar question concerning the presumption
under Vermont civil unions' law that a civil union partner is a legal parent of any child(ren)
born into that relationship, and whether the presumption would be recognized by other states.
Mark Strasser, When is a Parent not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presumptions of
Parenthood, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 299 (2001). He concluded that parents might be safer
pursuing adoptions, rather than relying on the presumption, given the uncertainty surrounding
the interstate recognition of rights provided to Vermont civil unions, although he too believes
that the anti-marriage statutes should have no effect on the parental rights of civil union
partners. See id. at 315-16.
13 AB 25 was signed on October 14, 2001, by Governor Gray Davis of California. This
bill provides certain benefits to those domestic partners who register with the state. See 2001
Cal. Stat. 893, § 3. To register as domestic partners, go to http://www.ss.ca.gov
/business/sf/sfdp.htm. A description of the rights provided under the statute can be found at
http:llwww.nclrights.orglpublications/pubs/ab25QnA-l 1-Ol.pdf. (last visited Mar. 14,2003).
14 See National Center for Lesbian Rights, The Transition from Second-Parent
Adoptions to Stepparent Adoptions After AB 25, at http://www.nclrights.org/releases
/2ndparent-ab25.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
15 Ellen and Laurie decided that Ellen would have the child because then the child
would receive health insurance benefits through Ellen's employer. (At that time, Laurie was
self-insured because she was running her own small business out of their home.) Same-sex
couples and our families continue to face significant discrimination by the denial of access to
(continued)
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to their daughter, Martha, who is now four. Ellen and Laurie filed a petition
for adoption in early 2002, using the step-parent adoption procedure by which
Laurie could be legally recognized, along with Ellen, as one of Martha's
parents. 16
They decided to use the step-parent adoption procedure (instead of the
second-parent adoption procedure) because the viability of second-parent
adoption in California is in limbo, due to the case of Sharon S. v. Superior
Court of San Diego County, which is currently on appeal to the California
Supreme Court.' 7 In that case, the Fourth District Court of Appeals held that
the California statutes did not authorize the use of a "modified independent
adoption procedure" through which one lesbian parent could retain her
parental rights while letting her partner also adopt her child(ren). Although
thousands of such adoptions have been permitted in California,' 9 the
continuing viability of second parent adoptions is in limbo until the California
Supreme Court issues its decision in the case.
But a problem for Ellen, Laurie, and Martha has arisen with the promotion
that Laurie has just received from her new employer. Although the promotion
comes with recognition of Laurie's excellent work and a significant increase in
responsibility and salary, it raises difficult questions for this family. The
promotion requires Laurie to transfer to the company's office in Miami,
Florida. Laurie and Ellen are concerned about whether Laurie should accept
the promotion and move the family to Florida because of all the press they
employer-sponsored benefits for our family members, even though those benefits are provided
to married couples and their families. Increasingly, more and more employers are providing
benefits to end this discriminatory. practice. For a discussion of the growth in domestic
partnership benefits over the past twenty years, see Barbara J. Cox, "The Little Project: "From
Alternative Families to Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex Marriage, 15 Wis. WOMEN'SL .J.
77 (2000) [hereinafter Cox, Little Project] (this is an introduction to the republication of my
article, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation,
Legislation, and Collective Bargaining, 2 Wis. WOMEN'S L .J. 1 (1986) (in the Wisconsin
Women's Law Journal's 15th Anniversary volume).
16 See supra note 12, for a description of the procedure for step-parent adoptions in
California.
17 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 39 P.3d 512(2002). Since
granting the certiorari petition vacates the Court of Appeals decision, the viability of same-sex
second parent adoptions in California is in legal limbo, The court of appeals decision has been
"depublished." See 2002 Cal. Lexis 459 (Cal. Jan. 29, 2002).
18 Sharon S., ll3Cal. Rptr. 2dat ll5.
19 See Sharon S. v. Sup. Ct. of San Diego County, 2001 Ca. App. Lexis 2199, at *3
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001) (modifying opinion and denying rehearing (i). The court revised
its opinion to eliminate the concern that other second parent adoptions might be invalid, and
limited the opinion to the parties before the court. There, the court referred to the "thousands
of adoptions that were undertaking using a modified independent adoption procedure .. ." Id.
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have seen about Florida's ban on adoptions by gay men and lesbians contained
in section 63.042(3) of the 2002 Florida Statutes.2° Several courts in Florida
have upheld the ban as constitutional, including, most recently, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in the case of Lofton v.
Kearney.21
Florida should be required to recognize the valid, final adoption decree
from California, despite the fact that Florida prohibits adoptions by lesbians
under Florida law. As the Supreme Court noted in Williams v. North
Carolina:
22
[W]hen a court of one state acting in accord with the
requirements of procedural due process alters the marital
status of one domiciled in that state by granting him a divorce
from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should be
excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because
its enforcement or recognition in another state would conflict
with the policy of the latter.
Just as divorce decrees from other states are entitled to recognition under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, so too are adoption decrees. But those who
oppose the recognition of same-sex couples would argue that Florida should
not have to recognize Laurie's adoption of Martha because of the ban in
Florida of adoption by gay men and lesbians under section 63.042(3) of the
2002 Florida Statutes,24 and Florida's anti-marriage statute section 741.212,25
which prohibits recognition of marriages by same-sex couples or our
relationships that are treated as marriages. The anti-marriage statute
specifically reads:
(1) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into in
any jurisdiction, ... or relationships between persons of the
20 See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002) (stating: "[n]o person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."). Significant press occurred when Rosie
O'Donnell added her support to fighting this ban. See Jessica DuLong, Rosie's crusade: Could
the 'Queen of Nice' turn the tide for gay adoption, ADVOCATE, Apr. 16, 2002, at 15; Monica
Collins, Rosie O'Donnell adopts new personal crusade and comes out on 'Primetime', B.
HERALD, Mar. 14, 2002, at 41.
21 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001); see also William E. Adams, Jr., A Look at
Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida Today: Confronting the Lingering Effects of Legal Animus,
24 NOVA L. REV. 751 (2000); Carolyn S. Grigsby, Note, Lofton v. Kearney, Discrimination
Declared Constitutional in Florida, 21 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 199 (2002).
22 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
23 Id. at 303. For a further discussion of this case, see infra Part Ell.
24 FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002).
25 Id. § 741.212.
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same sex which are treated as marriages in any jurisdiction,
... are not recognized for any purpose in this state.
2) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may
not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any state ...of the United States ... respecting
either a marriage or relationship not recognized under
subsection (I) or a claim arising from such a marriage or
relationship.2
It is clear that this statute should not apply to Laurie and Sandy's situation
for two reasons. First, their domestic partnership in California is not "treated
as a marriage" because it provides extremely limited rights as compared to
those provided to married couples, and thus does not come within the scope of
the Florida statute.27 Second, Florida will not be permitted to refuse to
recognize a valid judicial proceeding from California due to the commands of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause,28 which the rest of this article will explain.
Others may argue that the so-called Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA")29 created an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
prior Supreme Court precedent that excuses Florida from its usual obligation
to recognize the California adoption judgment. Section 2 of DOMA states, in
part: "No State ... shall be required to give effect to any ...judicial
proceeding of any other State... respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,..
.or a right or claim arising from such relationship."
30
But Congress could not have intended to invalidate the adoptions by same-
sex couples in situations such as Laurie and Ellen's, even though the adoption
was permitted in California as a "right arising from ' 3 1 the domestic partnership
relationship between the two women. To do so would violate the Full Faith
26 Id.
27 AB 25 and recent legislation provide about fifteen rights to same-sex couples who
register as domestic partners. See 2001 Bill Text CA. AB. 25 (Lexis). In contrast, married
couples receive hundreds of rights from states and over 1049 rights and benefits from the
federal government. See Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil
Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VERMONT L. REv. 113, 113
n.3, 145 n. 151 (2000) [hereinafter Cox, But Why Not Marriage]; A Partial List of Marital
Rights and Responsibilities That Are Denied to Same-Sex Couples and Their Families in
California, at http://www.nchights.org/publications/lgbtfamilies.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2003).
28 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
29 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2002).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2002).
31 See id.
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and Credit Clause32 and alter almost two hundred years of Supreme Court
precedent. The remainder of this article explains why Laurie's valid, final
judgment adopting Martha in California must be recognized in Florida and
every other state in the nation.
11. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGES BY SAME-SEX
COUPLES
Before discussing interstate recognition of adoption decrees by gay men or
lesbian parents, it may be helpful to understand interstate recognition of
marriages, especially considering the role that the anti-marriage statutes passed
by Congress, Florida, and thirty-five other states have in our discussion.
Virtuaally all states have upheld the validity of a marriage by their own
domiciliaries (or others) if that marriage was valid under the law of the state
where it was celebrated. 33 States recognize these out-of-state marriages by
their domiciliaries or others, even when they violate the internal law of the
forum state, because of the strong public policy reasons behind such
recognition:
The validation rule confirms the parties' expectations, it
provides stability in an area where stability (because of
children and property) is very important, and it avoids the
potentially hideous problems that would arise if the legality of
a marriage varies from state to state. The parties' expectations
arise from the fact that the married couple needs to know
reliably and certainly, and at once, whether they are married
or not. Additionally, the concern about uncertainty arises
either because the couple is married in one state and not
another or because the couple's marital status is ambiguous
during the pursuit of litigation to determine it.
34
Thus, for example, my sister who decided to get married while on vacation
in South Carolina could be sure, without consulting a lawyer, that her marriage
would be valid when she returned to her home state of Kentucky. My other
sister who married in Tennessee had no question that her marriage would be
recognized by her domicile, Kentucky. And, my parents never considered
whether their marriage, which occurred in Illinois, would be recognized when
they returned to their domicile of Wisconsin or moved to Kentucky ten years
32 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
33 See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii,
Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033, 1064 [hereinafter
Cox, If We Marry] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971) and
WiLLIAM M. RICHVAN, ET. AL., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 116 (2d ed. 1993)).
34 Cox, If We Marry, supra note 33, at 1065 (citing Richman,.supra note 33, at § 116
and ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 220 (4th ed. 1986)).
2003]
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later.
It would be impossible for a married couple in our mobile, transitory
country to have their marital status change as they traveled or moved around
the country. Imagine having a "marriage visa ' 35 that needed to be stamped as
you moved from state to state, sometimes indicating that you were married and
sometimes indicating that you were not. 36 This would be a terrible situation, so
most states have agreed to recognize a marriage in their state, even if it could
not be entered into under the local law of that state, if it was valid where
celebrated. This has been true even if the couple before the court were
domiciliaries of that state, left the state because they were prevented from
getting married by the local law of that state, went to another state where they
could marry, stayed long enough to marry, and then returned to their home
state.
In numerous and repeated cases, courts have recognized out-of-state
marriages even when the marriage violated the domicile's restrictions on
underage marriages, on incestuous marriages (such as first cousin or
uncle/niece marriages), on adultery or when divorced persons could remarry,
and even on polygamous marriages for some limited purposes.37 In the
significant majority of these cases, the courts treated the couple as married. 38
Only with interracial marriages were courts, particularly those in the South,
consistently unwilling to recognize the marriage celebrated in another state.39
Most of these cases involved couples who lived in the forum state, left the state
because they were prohibited from marrying by state statute, married elsewhere
where the marriage was permitted, and then returned to the forum state to live
35 See Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the
"Defense of Marriage" Act, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 221, 228 (1996).
36 For a discussion of the similar problems that occur for gay men and lesbians who
have their sexual activities criminalized and decriminalized as they travel across the country,
see Deb Price, Anti-sodomy Laws Should Be Killed, THE DETRorr NEws, Dec. 9, 2002, at 9A.
37 See Cox, But Why Not Marriage, supra note 27, at 139, (citing Barbara J. Cox,
Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist?,
16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61,66 (1996) [hereinafter Cox, Public Policy Exception] (referring to
research from over thirty-two states as of September 1, 1996. The research of all fifty states
was completed by July 1998 and simply confirmed this nationwide standard of recognizing out-
of-state marriages in most cases)).
38 Some states have refused to recognize these out-of-state marriages, either because
they violated the internal public policy of the state or because they violated that state's
marriage evasion statutes preventing domiciliaries from leaving the state to marry in violation
of the state's internal statutes. For a discussion of these cases, see Cox, Public Policy
Exception, supra note 37, at 68-72, 96-99.
39 See Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation
Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 105 (1997).
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together.4n When the couple was married in their home state which permitted
the interracial marriage, however, the marriage was usually held to be valid by
other states, even if the couple would not have been permitted to marry in that
other state.4'
Courts refusing to recognize the out-of-state marriages of interracial
couples and other disfavored marriages did so based on the public policy
exception in choice-of-law theory. All major choice-of-law theories permit
courts to consider public policy when deciding whether to recognize the out-
of-state marriages by that state's own domiciliaries.42 For example, section
283(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws states the general
rule: "A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it
violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the
marriage. 43 Although the public policy exception has been little used since
the Supreme Court held the anti-miscegenation statutes to be unconstitutional
and its viability remains in question today,44 it is likely that courts will try to
resuscitate it to refuse to validate marriages by same-sex couples.
Only to the extent the out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples are
equated with the out-of-state marriages of interracial couples should courts be
expected to refuse to treat them as equal to those marriages by couples also
prohibited from marrying within their home states but whose marriages were
validated. Since we now understand that the refusal by courts to validate out-
of-state interracial marriages stemmed from the discriminatory underpinnings
of the laws prohibiting interracial marriages within their own state, it should
40 Id. at 1]9.
41 Id.
42 Marriages by domiciliaries of other states that were permitted under their home
state's statutes have almost universally been recognized as valid when those domiciliaries
moved to a new state where their marriage would not have been permitted. Cox, But Why Not
Marriage, supra note 27, at 141, and sources cited therein. This was true even with interracial
marriages. See Koppelman, supra note 39, at 116-127.
43 RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, at § 283(2) (emphasis added). The First Restatement
of Conflict of Laws, as well as Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis theory and
Robert Leflar's choice-influencing considerations theory, also instruct courts to consider public
policy when deciding whether to recognize out-of-state marriages. See Cox, Public Policy
Exception, supra note 37, at 63-65.
44 See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Law, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Larry Kramer, The Public Policy
Exception and the Problem of Extra-Territorial Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 16
QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 153 (1996).
45 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding the anti-miscegenation
statutes to rest solely on racial distinctions that were unconstitutional). The court specifically
(continued)
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be clear that the refusal by courts to validate out-of-state marriages by same-.46
sex couples would similarly stem from discrimination.
Much has been written about whether states are permitted under the public
policy exception of choice of law theories to refuse to .recognize some
marriages, particularly those by same-sex couples, if they violate the public
-policy of the forum state.47 Anticipating this issue, Congress passed the
improperly named, discriminatory Defense of Marriage Act, asserting that no
state had to recognize the marriage by a same-sex couple in another state, and
many other states have passed similar anti-marriage statutes claiming that they
do not have to recognize these marriages.48 Since no state has yet permitted
marriage by same-sex couples, the constitutional validity of these statutes has
not been challenged in court (although two states have had appellate-level
cases concerning the interstate recognition of Vermont civil unions).49
However, much controversy surrounds this question and much has been
found that the anti-miscegenation statutes of Virginia were "measures designed to maintain
White Supremacy." Id.
46 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999) (recognizing the "undeniable fact
that federal and state statutes-including those in Vermont-have historically disfavored same-
sex relationships," and that "to the extent state action historically has been motivated by an
animus against a class, that history cannot provide a legitimate basis for continued unequal
application of the law").
47 See Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-
Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 187, 234-38 (citing articles written on
interstate recognition of marriages by same-sex couples between January 1, 1993 to June 1,
1998). Numerous other articles have been written since that time, including Scott Fruehwald,
Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REv. 799 (1999); Lewis A. Silverman,
Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status, 89 Ky. L.J. 1075 (2000);
Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 363 (2002).
48 Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
49 See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), and Rosengarten v. Downes,
802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), cert. granted, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002) (dismissed as
moot due to the death of Rosengarten); see also Katie Eyer, Related Within the Second
Degree? Burns v. Burns and the Potential Benefits of Civil Union Status, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 297 (2002). Three trial courts have addressed this issue, with two of them recognizing
the Vermont civil unions and one refusing any legal recognition. See Langan v. St. Vincent's
Hosp. of N.Y., N.Y. Sup. Ct., (Nassau Cty., Apr. 2003) (civil union partner considered spouse
for purposes of wrongful death suit); In re Marriage of Gorman & Gump, W.V. Fan Ct.,
(Marion Cty., Jan. 2003); In re Marriage of RS & JA, Tex. Dist. Ct., (Jefferson Cty,, Mar.
2003) (judge originally ordered divorce of parties to a civil union and divided assets and debt;
Texas Attorney General intervened and objected to granting a divorce when civil union was not
a marriage, parties withdrew petition and case dismissed) (the preceding cases are on file with
author).
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written about it.
When Professor Strasser invited me to this symposium, I wondered what I
could possibly say about the interstate recognition of adoptions by lesbian and
gay parents. It seemed clear to me then (and still seems clear to me now) that
the controversy surrounding marriage does not and cannot apply in this area.
Unlike interstate recognition of marriages which have been analyzed under
conflict of law theories and precedent, the validity of one state's adoption
decree (which is a valid, final judgment by a court) in other states should
excite little controversy (except perhaps by those who hope the backlash
against the marriages of same-sex couples can be replicated against our
adoptions). The reason for this lack of controversy is because of the difference
in treatment by a court of the interstate recognition of judgments and the
interstate recognition of a statute. Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause
50
seemingly does not differentiate between the credit owed a "public act" or a
"judicial proceeding," Supreme Court and other precedent clearly makes that
distinction.5' While the courts have been willing to permit a state to use the
public policy exception in conflict of laws theory to refuse to recognize the
statutes of other states, virtually no similar exception exists for the recognition
of judgments.52 Once a court has decided a given case, a final judgment has
been issued, and all appeals have been taken or lapsed, then the judgment can
be taken from one state to another and used as a definitive statement of the
resolution of the issues between the parties.53 Only to a limited extent can that
judgment be challenged, in what is known as a collateral attack, usually for
lack of jurisdiction.54  The following section explains why interstate
recognition of adoption decrees is required by both the U.S. Constitution and
almost two-hundred years of Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, this
section explains why collateral attacks will not be available in most situations
to challenge the validity of adoption decrees, even those of gay or lesbian
parents.
III. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF ADOPTIONS BY GAY OR
LESBIAN PARENTS
It has been settled, since at least 1813, that the Supreme Court treats a
judgment from one state as a final resolution of the issues between the parties
50 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
51 Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON.L. REv. 255, 259 (1998).
52 See Whitten, supra note 6, at Part III; see also Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Hyatt,
71 U.S.L.W. 4307, at *1 (Apr. 23, 2003) (referring to recognition of judgments as "exacting"
and to statutes as "less demanding").
53 Whitten, supra note 6, at Part llH.
54 Whitten, supra note 6, at Part Im.
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in all other states. In Mills v. Duryee,55 the Court held that "final judgments of
one state bind the parties as res judicata in all other states unless the judgment
debtor can establish a ground for collateral attack generally recognized by the
common law. ' 6 Rather than review Supreme Court precedent since 1813, I
will use the scholarship of Professor Lynn Wardle, one of the organizers of this
symposium, and other commentators (who have argued that the Defense of
Marriage Act is constitutional) to explain why full and faith and credit must be
given to the out-of-state judgments that declared gay men and lesbians to be
the adoptive parents of their children. Since Professor Wardle wrote his
Creighton Law Review article in support of the power of Congress under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to adopt the Defense of Marriage Act and permit
states to refuse to recognize other states' marriages of same-sex couples, it
seems a useful resource when discussing whether states must recognize the
judgments of other states that have permitted gay men and lesbians to adopt
children. 7
Professor Wardle primarily focused on the two Williams v. North Carolina
cases5 8 to illustrate the recognition that states must give to judgments of other
states and the limited opportunities for states to refuse such recognition. My
focus will be the same. Professor Wardle stated:
The Court's decision in Williams I establishes certain limits
on the power of states to refuse to recognize divorce
judgments from sister states. The Court's holding in
Williams II establishes certain grounds upon which the
second state may refuse to recognize divorce decrees from
sister states. The opinion of Williams I vindicates the power
of a state to enter divorce decrees that must be given full faith
and credit; likewise, the Court's decision in Williams H
vindicates the power of a state to protect its domiciliaries and
their marriages by refusing to give certain out-of-state divorce
decrees full faith and credit.
59
Although both cases concerned interstate recognition of divorce decrees,
55 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
56 Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Inter-Jurisdictional
Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 147, 158 (1998). "As a
practical matter, Mills meant that a judgment debtor could escape the effect of a judgment only
if he [or she] could show that the court rendering the judgment lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction or that there existed some other well-established defense to
the judgment." Id.
57 Wardle, supra note 47.
58 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); (Williams I), Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 227 (1945) (Williams II).
59 Wardle, supra note 47, at 188.
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Professor Wardle pointed out that they "establish interstate marital status
recognition doctrines that are relevant, suggest jurisdictional principles that are
potentially significant, and illustrate interstate comity principles that are
profoundly pertinent to the growing debate over same-sex marriage
recognition." These cases provide similar principles and illustrations relevant
to the debate over interstate recognition of adoptions by gay men and lesbians.
In the first subsection below, I discuss Williams I, Professor Wardle's
characterizations of that opinion, and its clear applicability to the interstate
recognition of adoptions by lesbian and gay parents. I also discuss Williams I,
and Professor Wardle's characterizations of that opinion. In the second
subsection, I explain why Williams I requires interstate recognition of these
adoption decrees, the Defense of Marriage Act notwithstanding. Additionally,
I explain why Williams H will not prevent interstate recognition of these
adoption decrees because collateral attacks will rarely be successful when
questioning whether the adoption decree from one state must be recognized by
other states. I conclude that subsection with a discussion of the important
policy reasons for ensuring that states give the adoption decrees of lesbian and
gay parents the interstate recognition to which they are entitled.
A. Williams I, Williams II, and Interstate Recognition of Judgments
Williams I involved the question of whether North Carolina had to
recognize divorce decrees from Nevada by two people who previously had
been married in North Carolina to separate spouses.6 Otis Williams married
Carrie Wyke in 1916 and lived with her for twenty-four years; Lillie Shaver
married Thomas Hendrix in 1920 and lived with him for twenty years.62 In
May 1940, Otis and Lillie moved to Las Vegas, Nevada where they established
a residence. 63 Six weeks later, they each filed a petition for divorce from their
spouses in North Carolina, were later divorced in uncontested suits in Nevada,
and were married there that same October. 64 They returned to North Carolina
almost immediately, and were indicted for bigamy on the grounds that the
Nevada divorce decrees were invalid.65 The jury found the defendants guilty,
and both were sentenced to prison.66 The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed these convictions, concluding that the Nevada decrees were not
entitled to full faith and credit.67
Without addressing the domicile issue that would be the focus of Williams
60 Wardle, supra note 47, at 188.
61 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
62 Wardle, supra note 47, at 189.
63 Wardle, supra note 47, at 189.
64 Wardle, supra note 47, at 189-90.
65 Wardle, supra note 47, at 190.
66 Wardle, supra note 47, at 190.
67 Wardle, supra note 47, at 190.
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J1,68 the court focused on "whether the domiciliary state of one spouse could
enter a divorce decree entitled to full faith and credit in the state of marital
domicile where an abandoned spouse still lived. 69 Quoting the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, Justice Douglas (who wrote the majority opinion), stated that
the 1790 implementing statute,70 "providing for the same faith and credit to be
given to judgments in sister states as the have in the state rendering them, was
the rule governing the Williams case.
Emphasizing "heavily" the unifying and integrative purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, Justice Douglas concluded:
[a] broad interpretation of the full faith and credit statute was
consistent with the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to 'alter the status of the several states as independent
sovereignties, each free to ignore... the judicial proceedings
of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single
nation. 72
Professor Wardle noted the importance Douglas placed on using the
Clause to "'bring separate sovereigns into an integrated whole"' and on "[tihe
fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause substituted an absolute command for
comity seemed to underscore the value of having an absolute recognitionlile973
According to Professor Wardle, "Justice Douglas' opinion distinguished
the full faith and credit that is required to be given to judgments from that
required to be given to statutes. 74 Although Justice Douglas "admitted... in
case of statutes" that "some latitude for nonrecognition to accommodate the
conflicting and 'superior' interests of the forum state is necessary," he found
the exception to mandatory recognition of statutes to be 'a narrow one. 75 But
as far as judgments were concerned, Justice Douglas noted," 'the exceptions
68 Wardle, supra note 47, at 191-92. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,
227 (1945) (Williams II).
69 Wardle, supra note 47, at 192.
70 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The statute was numbered 28 U.S.C. § 687 at the time of
the Court's decision.
71 Wardle, supra note 47, at 192. Justice Douglas cited Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1918); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); and Davis v. Davis, 305
U.S. 32, 40 (1938) as precedent finding the implementing statute of 1790 meant that "the
second state must give a sister state judgment 'the same credit, validity, and effect' as it would
be given in the state that rendered it." Wardle, supra note 47, at 193.
72 Wardle, supra note 47, at 193 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina 317 U.S. 287,
295 (1942) (Williams I)).
73 Wardle, supra note 47, at 193 (quoting Williams I, 317 U.S. at 303).
74 Wardle, supra note 47, at 193.
75 Wardle, supra note 47, at 193-94 (quoting Williams , 317 U.S. at 294-95).
2003] LESBIAN AND GAY ADOPTION 765
have been few and far between, apart from Haddock v. Haddock, ,,76 and
"Haddock was portrayed as an exception to the general rule of mandatory full
faith and credit for judgments.",77 Professor Wardle explained that the court's
holding "reiterated 'that Congress in its sweeping requirement thatjudgments
of the courts of one state be given full faith and credit in the courts of another'
has not created any exception to that command.,
78
Professor Wardle' s article provides guidance to those wondering whether
one state may refuse to recognize another state's adoption decree because that
adoption decree would not have been permitted in the forum state. He noted
that "like or dislike for the internal policy of another state was irrelevant for
interstate recognition." 79
Justice Douglas expansively and repeatedly emphasized that
Full Faith and Credit given to sister-state divorce judgments,
unlike purely domestic divorce, does not depend upon the
forum state's substantive policy on divorce. The majority
opinion considered and rejected a general exception to the
rule of recognition in order to protect local public policy...
.The difference between intrastate divorce policy, which a
state may control, and interstate recognition, was reiterated.
Intrastate divorce policy involves a choice in the realm of
morals and religion [that] rests with the legislatures of the
states. But interstate judgment recognition is different.80
When a court of one state acting in accord with the
requirements of procedural due process alters the marital
status of one domiciled in that state by granting him a divorce
from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should be
excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because
its enforcement or recognition in another state would conflict
with the policy of the latter.8 '
76 201 U.S. 562 (1906) (holding that a divorce decree by the newly acquired domicile
of the husband was not entitled to full faith and credit in the state where the married couple last
lived together, when the wife was abandoned and was not personally served).
77 Wardle, supra note 47, at 194 (quoting Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 294-95) (emphasis
omitted).
78 Wardle, supra note 47, at 194 (quoting Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 303) (emphasis
omitted).
79 Wardle, supra note 47, at 195.
80 Wardle, supra note 47, at 194-95 (quoting Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 303).
81 Wardle, supra note 47, at 195 (quoting Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 303). Justice Douglas
explained that even Haddock had not challenged the general rule "that even though the cause of
action could not have been entertained in the state of the forum, ajudgment obtained thereon in
(continued)
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Justice Douglas explained that "it is difficult to perceive" how North
Carolina, the "new" domicile of the married couple, could claim an interest
that was superior to that of Nevada over Nevada's own domiciliaries.82
(Remember that Otis and Lillie lived in Nevada long enough to become
Nevada domiciliaries by the time of their divorces, at least for purposes of
Williams 1).83 Justice Douglas recognized "no authority for the argument that
'the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels the courts of one state to subordinate
the local polic, of that state, as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any
other state.'
In divorce cases, the basis for the Nevada court's jurisdiction was that
Nevada had become the domicile of Otis and Lillie.85 The majority believed
that the Nevada decrees were "wholly effective" to change the marital status of
Otis and Lillie in Nevada.86 Domicile of the plaintiff entitles the divorce
decree to have extraterritorial effect, and domicile gave Nevada the power to
"'alter within its own borders the marriage status of spouses domiciled there,
even though the other spouse is absent.' "87
Justice Douglas' opinion expressed the majority's strong concern about the
"'intensely practical considerations"' that would result 'if one is lawfully
divorced and remarried in Nevada and still married to the first spouse in North
a sister state is entitled to full faith and credit." Wardle, supra note 47, at 190 (quoting
Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 297). In Haddock, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the
Connecticut divorce decree because Connecticut lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment that
would be valid in New York, "not because the Connecticut substantive rule was rejected in
New York. Moreover, the full faith and credit statute did not contain any exception permitting
nonrecognition because the local public policy of the second state is offended." Wardle, supra
note 47, at 195 (citing Williams , 317 U.S. at 303).
82 Wardle, supra note 47, at 194-95 (quoting Williams 1, 317 U. S. at 303).
83 See Williams , 317 U.S. at 290, 299.
84 Wardle, supra note 47, at 195 (quoting Williams!, 317 U.S. at 296). Obviously, this
is what Florida would be trying to do if it claimed that it did not have to recognize the valid,
final adoption decree from California in Laurie and Ellen's situation. For an argument that
subordination of judicial decisions to legislative ones is constitutional (rather than the current
practice of subordinating legislative decisions to judicial ones); see Jeff Rensberger, Same-Sex
Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full Faith
and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv 409, 450-52 (1998).
85 See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 299.
86 Id.
87 Wardle, supra note 47, at 196 (quoting Williams , 317 U.S. at 299). Professor Ralph
Whitten, in this symposium, explains that the domicile state of the adoptive child or adoptive
parents also has jurisdiction over an adoption petition such as Laurie and Ellen's. See Whitten,
supra note 6, at 8-10. Thus California, as the domicile of Laurie, Ellen, and Martha at the time
of the adoption, had valid jurisdiction of the lawsuit.
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Carolina.' ' 88 Just like the problems described above when a couple has a
"marriage visa" that is stamped as they move from state-to-state, changing
their marital status as they move, so too the Williams I Court was concerned
about the "'complicated and serious condition"' that would result, and
recognized that "'[tihe problem of inconsistent marital status and inconsistent
judgments in different states presented a 'perplexing and distressing
complication." 89
A rule such as the one allowed in Haddock (which permitted one state to
refuse to recognize another state's final judgments) could cause "'considerable
disaster to innocent persons' and 'bastardize children' ... ,90 Justice Douglas
repeated the majority's concern about the "'substantial and far-reaching effects
which the allowance of an exception [to interstate recognition of divorce
decrees] would have on innocent persons. ' 91
Finally, Professor Wardle explained, "[w]hile a state could choose to
restrict the divorce jurisdiction of its own courts to cases in which there was
consent or fault of the absent spouse, it could not deny full faith and credit to a
sister state divorce judgment on that ground., 92 He stated that the majority
thought the Haddock rule to be "too complicated and troublesome" to correctly
state the constitutional rule for recognition of out-of-state judgments.93
Reiterating that under the full faith and credit statute there
was no exception to mandatory full faith and credit, such as
[the Supreme Court had] articulated in Haddock, and re-
emphasizing that the 'substantial and far-reaching effects
which the allowance of an exception would have on innocent
persons,' as well as the 'purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and of the supporting legislation,' the Court explicitly
declared: 'Haddock v. Haddock is overruled,' the North
Carolina judgment was reversed, and the case remanded.94
Although Justice Douglas understood that requiring states to recognize
sister states' divorce judgments could result in "'a substantial dilution"' of
state sovereignty in those states that permitted few divorces by those states that
granted divorces more easily, Professor Wardle noted that Justice Douglas
"brushed that concern aside, simply noting that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause produces the same effect in 'many other situations."
95
88 Wardle, supra note 47, at 196 (quoting Williams , 317 U.S. at 301, 299).
89 Wardle, supra note 47, at 196 (quoting Williams , 317 U.S. at 299-300).
90 Wardle, supra note 47, at 197 (quoting Williams , 317 U.S. at 301).
91 Wardle, supra note 47, at 197 (quoting Williams , 317 U.S. at 303-04).
92 Wardle, supra note 47, at 197.
93 Wardle, supra note 47, at 197.
94 Wardle, supra note 47, at 197.
95 Wardle, supra note 47, at 198 (quoting Williams , 317 U.S. at 302).
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The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter indicated that "authority
over marriage and divorce" was reserved to the states;96 and acknowledged the
well-settled, general rule "'under both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
general full faith and credit statute that 'if a judgment is binding in the state
where it was rendered, it is equally binding in every other state. ' According
to Professor Wardle, Justice Frankfurter concluded that, assuming that Otis
and Lillie had become domiciliaries of Nevada before their divorces were
rendered, then "denial of full faith and credit would mean that North Carolina
was imposing its divorce policy on Nevada as much as North Carolina claimed
recognition of the Nevada divorces would impose Nevada policy on North
Carolina."98
After remand, North Carolina brought a second suit against Otis and Lillie,
using the dissenting opinions of Justices Murphy and Jackson as the basis for
its argument that Nevada had not legitimately become their domicil and, thus,
the judgments granting those divorces were invalid.99 Again, Otis and Lillie
were convicted."t°
On this second appeal, which the North Carolina courts also upheld, the
Supreme Court stated the issue as "whether North Carolina had the power 'to
refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to the
findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds that no bona fide domicile
was acquired in Nevada."'' ' 1 This time, Justice Frankfurter wrote the
96 Wardle, supra note 47, at198 (quoting Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 304 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)). This raises the obvious question of why Congress defined "marriage" and
"spouse" for federal purposes for the first time in the so-called Defense of Marriage Act,
instead of continuing its longstanding tradition of applying each state's definitions of those
terms to that state's residents whenever a federal issue arose. That Congress overstepped its
bounds and legislated in an area which the Constitution left within state authority is clear. See
Cox, supra note 27, at 144-46 (discussing why Congress should not have entered into this area
of law); see also Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of
CongressionalAuthority, 97 CoLuM. L. REv. 1435 (1997); Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three
of the Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
419 (1999).
97 Wardle, supra note 47, at 198 (quoting Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 306 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
98 Wardle, supra note 47, at 198-99.
99 Wardle, supra note 47, at 201-02. It is interesting to note that while Williams I was
on review, the original Mrs. Williams died and Mr. Hendrix remarried. Despite the fact that no
North Carolina residents remained interested in the suit, North Carolina pursued the
prosecutions anyway.
100 Wardle, supra note 47, at 202.
101 Wardle, supra note 47, at 203 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina 325 U.S. 226,
227 (1945) (Williams II)). The Court used the older spelling of domicile ("domicil") and I do
the same when quoting the Court's language.)
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majority's opinion, reiterating the rule
that... had long been established that the judgment of a state
should have the same credit, validity, and effect in every
other court in the United States that it has in the state in
which it was rendered, so long as the jurisdiction of the
rendering court is not impeached. 102
But if the court did not have proper jurisdiction over the case, the court's
judgment was subject to collateral attack. To decide whether jurisdiction
existed, the court had to determine whether the parties had become domiciled
in Nevada, because "jurisdiction to grant a divorce is founded on domicile, a
principle that was established in 1789 and never questioned since."' 0 3
Reminding the Court's readers of basic principles of civil procedure,
Justice Frankfurter noted that issues once litigated cannot be re-litigated by the
parties, but since the issue of domicile had never been contested and since
North Carolina had never been a party to the Nevada proceeding, it "was not
bound by the recitation of domicil declared by the Nevada court."' 4 Professor
Wardle explained that:
A State concerned with vindicating its own social policy
should not be bound by an unfounded recital [of domicile] in
the record of another state. It has a right to ascertain for itself
the truth of the jurisdictional facts, even if the court of the
first state inquired into the question of domicile. Full faith
and credit requires respect for a divorce judgment provided
the jurisdictional facts are established ....
Justice Frankfurter was clear to note that when
[T]he problem of sister states improperly nullifying each
others' divorce judgments because they dislike the divorce
law of the sister state will not arise if the second states must
limit their inquiry to the facts of jurisdiction. They may not
deny full faith and credit to divorce decrees merely "under the
guise of finding an absence of domicil ..... ,106
Although North Carolina had a heavy burden when challenging Nevada's
previous finding that domicile existed, the majority determined that North
Carolina's conclusion that Otis and Lillie were not domiciled in Nevada was
102 Wardle, supra note 47, at 203 (emphasis added).
103 Wardle, supra note 47, at 203.
104 Wardle, supra note 47, at 204.
105 Wardle, supra note 47, at 204.
106 Wardle, supra note 47, at 204 (quoting Williamsll, 325 U.S. at 233).
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"'amply supported in evidence."" 0 7 That evidence included that (1) Otis and
Lillie had been residents of North Carolina for a long time, (2) they lived in an
"'auto-court for transients"' only long enough to obtain divorces and get
remarried, and (3) they then returned to North Carolina to live. 10 8 Thus, the
jury could have found that rather than changing their domicile, Otis and Lillie
intended to return to North.Carolina the entire time they were in Nevada and,
therefore, remained domiciliaries of North Carolina. 1°9 The Supreme Court
affirmed their convictions.l l0
Justice Murphy's concurring opinion noted that "Nevada could grant
divorces on any grounds it chose to all who meet due process requirements,
and those divorces would be valid in Nevada.'' 1 The domicile of at least one
of the parties had the 'exclusive right to regulate"' marital relations, including
dissolution, and the Court's opinion did not "jeopardize uncontested divorces,
except "'those based upon fraudulent domiciles.""' 
2
Finally, the case against Otis and Lillie ended. Upon remand, they
remarried in North Carolina, and the parties were paroled without ever serving
time in jail.'' 3
Professor Wardle' s characterization of the Williams I case makes it clear
that the adoption decrees of lesbian and gay parenting must receive the same
recognition and effect in other states as in the state that renders them, under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. His characterization of Williams 11 makes it clear
that only those rare decrees that are subject to collateral attack, because of
questions concerning the domicile of the adoptive parent(s) or child(ren), will
be subject to challenge in other states.' 14
B. The Defense of Marriage Act Should Not Be Interpreted to Weaken the
Constitutional Demands of Williams I Concerning Adoption Decrees by
Lesbian and Gay Parents, and Williams II Holds Little Promise For
Collaterally Attacking Those Decrees
Professor Wardle noted that both Williams I and Williams II continue to be
107 Wardle, supra note 47, at 204 (quoting Williams II, 325 U.S. at 234).
108 Wardle, supra note 47, at 204-05 (quoting Williams II, 325 U.S. at 235-36).
109 * Wardle, supra note 47, at 205.
10 Wardle, supra note 47 at 204.
III Wardle, supra note 47, at 205.
112 Wardle, supra note 47, at 205-06 (quoting Williams II, 325 U.S. at 241, 242
(Murphy, J., concurring)).
113 Wardle, supra note 47, at 208.
114 For example, if a Florida couple left the state, changed their domicile to another state,
immediately adopted a child in that state, and then returned to Florida, it may be possible that
an attack could be made on the adoption decree. However, to be successful, as in Williams II,
such an attack would have to determine that the parents never intended to change their
domicile, and thus, remained Florida citizens and subject to Florida law.
[31:751
LESBIAN AND GAY ADOPTION
good law today, both are regularly cited by federal and state courts, and Justice
Kennedy cited Williams I in his 1998 concurring opinion in Baker v. Gen.
Motors Corp. " 5 Professor Wardle argued that Williams I does not support
interstate recognition of marriages by same-sex couples, however, and stated:
First, the key term in the statement about the Full Faith and
Credit clause altering state power to refuse recognition to
judgments is judgments. Williams I focused on
nonrecognition of a divorce judgment, explicitly
distinguishing judgments from statutes in terms of full faith
and credit, and the majority emphasized that the range of
latitude for nonrecognition of judgments is particularly
'narrow' and the exceptions very few.' 16
Like the Court in Williams I, we too are concerned with interstate
recognition ofjudgments, not statutes, and thus the latitude for nonrecognition
of Laurie's adoption of Martha is "particularly narrow."
Later in his article, Professor Wardle again discussed the "judicial
proceedings" language in the Defense of Marriage Act. He stated that section
2 applies to records and judgments as well as statutes, and that DOMA permits
one state to refuse "to recognize that marriage, even if the same-sex couple
received a judgment in [another] state recognizing their 'marriage' as valid.""1 17
Without digressing to explain my disagreements with Professor Wardle's
DOMA analysis generally, I believe that he is wrong about the viability of
DOMA, at least with regard to its claim to permit states to refuse recognition to
other state's judgments.
Assuming a valid, final judgment in one state finding the same-sex couple
to be married or to have rights based on their marital status, I agree with
Professor Wardle when he states that "the historical practice gives a strong
presumption that such ajudgment would be entitled to full faith and credit and
that the second state could not refuse to recognize it. There is significant
language in Williams I and Williams II to support that conclusion.""
8
However, Professor Wardle goes on to assert that DOMA has created an
exception to this general rule, one that is "focused, narrow, and specific."" 9
115 Wardle, supra note 47, at 208-09 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,
243 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) ("We have often recognized the second State's
obligation to give effect to another State's judgments even when the law underlying those
judgments contravenes the public policy of the second State.").
116 Wardle, supra note 47, at 214-15 (citing Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 294-95).
117 Wardle, supra note 47, at 229.
118 Wardle, supra note 47, at 230.
119 Wardle, supra note 47, at 230. This is just one of the many reasons why I believe
DOMA is unconstitutional. To select the "focused, narrow, and specific" situation of
marriages by same-sex couples against which to impose a rule refusing recognition to
(continued)
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Thus, assuming the second state had a clear policy of not extending benefits to
nor recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples, Wardle believes that
"under Williams I and M courts should rule that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not compel states to recognize same-sex marriage judgments."120
I believe that Professor Wardle's analysis of Williams I and Williams II,
stated earlier, argues persuasively and correctly for why Congress overstepped
its bounds by passing DOMA and including judgments within its command.
Additionally, and more to the point for this article, the exception claimed to be
permitted under DOMA does not apply to the interstate recognition of
adoptions by gay men and lesbians, even when those adoptions are based on
the underlying same-sex relationship of the parents. As broad as DOMA
claims to be, the judgment in an adoption situation is one between a parent and
a child who have legally created a parent-child relationship, and the sexual
relationship of the parents is irrelevant to that final judgment (even if it
provided the initial statutory basis for obtaining the adoption2.)1
Others who agree with Professor Wardle on the validity of DOMA with
regard to statutes and the interstate recognition of marriages by same-sex
couples seem disturbed by DOMA's claim that it gives states the authority to
refuse to recognize judgments concerning the marriages of same-sex couples
or those relationships that are treated as marriages. Three commentators who
generally support the constitutionality of DOMA have explained their
discomfort with the notion that DOMA permits non-recognition of judgments
relating to the relationships of same-sex couples which are treated as
marriages.
Professor Jeffrey Rensberger discussed some of the broader implications
of DOMA in his Creighton Law Review article. 22 He noted that "in the
context of judgments, full faith and credit is robust. The usual understanding
of the full faith and credit owed to a judgment is that F<2> must give sister-
state judgments the same effect they would have in the rendering state. Unlike
judgments between states, when the Supreme Court has consistently required that judgments
receive recognition by sister states since 1813, and when Congress has not previously defined
marriage or spouse but left those decisions where they rightfully belong with the states, shows
the clear discriminatory nature of the statute. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)
("We cannot accept the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does
no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes
a special disability on those persons alone.").
120 Wardle, supra note 47, at 231.
121 See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners But Not Parents/Recognizing Parents
But Not Partners: Lesbian and Gay Family Law in Europe and the United States, XVII N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711 (2000) (discussing how U.S. courts tend not to consider the underlying
relationships of lesbian and gay parents when addressing parenting issues-at least for adoption
purposes-while the courts of other countries do).
122 Rensberger, supra note 84.
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the choice of law situation, F<2> thus may not simply rely on local policies to
avoid the effect of a sister-state judgment." 23 He stated that before DOMA, "a
state had to enforce sister-state judgments even though they offend state
policies of a fundamental order."
Professor Rensberger cited Fauntleroy v. Lum,'25 as "the paradigm case for
the full faith and credit requirement as applied to judgments." In that case, two
Mississippi residents entered into a contract in cotton futures in that state, a
contract that Mississippi treated as one for gambling, which was not only
unenforceable but also prohibited by criminal statute. 26 The plaintiff served
the defendant while he was temporarily in Missouri, and a Missouri court gave
the plaintiff a judgment on the contract. The Missouri court reached this result
despite the clear requirement under choice-of-law theory that Mississippi law
should have applied, which would have resulted in a judgment for the
defendant that the contract was unenforceable. 27 The Mississippi courts
declined to enforce the judgment, and the Supreme Court reversed those
courts' decisions.
In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court concluded that the "validity of
[the Missouri] judgment, even in Mississippi, is, as we believe, the result of
the Constitution as it always has been understood."'' 28 The case clearly stands
"for the proposition that there is a self-executing command in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause as to judgments that mirrors the language of section 1738,"
and which requires "that the judgment of a state court should have the same
credit, validity, and effect in every other court in the United States, which it
had in the state where it was brought."' 129  Without DOMA, Professor
Rensberger concluded that the forum state must honor the prior judgment of a
sister state, "even though it conflicts with a profound policy" of the forum
state. 30 The question then became whether Congress, when it passed DOMA,
had the authority "to substantively alter the otherwise prevailing rules of full
faith and credit under the Constitution.'' 1
3 1
Professor Rensberger argued that Congress did have the power to lessen
132the command of Full Faith and Credit to be provided to judgments. But
123 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 446-47. (When referring to F<2>, Professor
Rensberger is referring to the choice-of-law situation where the forum state is F<2> and the
state which took the initial action is F<1>.)
124 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 444.
125 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
126 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 447.
127 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 447.
128 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 447.
129 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 447-48.
130 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 448.
131 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 448.
132 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 449-55.
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even while believing that Congress had the power to do so, he stated that
It is in the area of judgments that I believe Congress may
have mis-stepped. I do believe that the current law of full
faith and credit has overemphasized the value of the finality
of judicial decisions at the expense of legislative policy. A
narrow statute designed to reassert the power of legislatures
in a particular context seems unobjectionable. But the cases
in which such an exception make the most sense are those in
which the judgment was most clearly in error and the
legislative policy most clearly upset .... [But a narrower
version of DOMA] would raise far fewer objections than the
actual Act, which does not distinguish between the credit due
to sound judgments and questionable ones.' 33
Such a revised DOMA would, according to Professor Rensberger, only
"target judgments that affirm same-sex marriage between domiciliaries of a
state that bars such marriages."' 134 Clearly, it would not apply to an adoption
decree, issued by a state that permits its domiciliaries to adopt as one of the
benefits provided to them as part of that state's recognition and protection of
their same-sex relationship.
Additionally, Dean Patrick Borchers also wrote about the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, DOMA, and same-sex marriage in the same Creighton Law
Review symposium issue that contained Professors Wardle' s and Rensberger's
articles.'1 5 There, Dean Borchers explained the distinction between judgments
and statutes for Full Faith and Credit Purposes:
Judgments-assuming they meet the Court's exacting
definition-are essentially unassailable if presented to another
court, unless entered without personal or subject matter
jurisdiction. Sister state laws, however, are by no means
entitled to automatic application. Rather, courts are permitted
to apply their own law and refuse the application of a sister
state's law in almost all cases. 
36
Professor Borchers also seemed troubled by DOMA's claim to apply to
judgments that may arise out of the marriage or relationship of a same-sex
couple. He says, "I, for one, would not construe DOMA to affect the
obligation of courts to recognize money judgments simply because the
existence of a same-sex marriage played into the underlying theory that led to
133 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 455-56.
134 Rensberger, supra note 84, at 456.
135 See Borchers, supra note 56.
136 Borchers, supra note 56, at 164.
[31:751
LESBIAN AND GAY ADOPTION
the judgment."'' 37 Even though Professor Borchers believes that DOMA
would be upheld even if it were interpreted to permit states to refuse
recognition to otherwise valid judgments, 38 he anticipates that "courts will
probably be reluctant to deny enforcement of such judgments, no matter how
negative the sentiments about same-sex marriages might be in their states.'
139
Additionally, Professor Ralph Whitten, who also writes on the interstate
recognition of adoption judgments in this symposium issue, has previously
stated that Congress, when passing DOMA, included "judicial proceedings" to
prevent "bogus" declaratory judgments in one state that the same-sex couple
was married, which could then be used to bind other states to find that the
couple's marriage must also be recognized there. 140  Although Whitten
believes Congress has the power to do so, he is concerned that:
In doing so, however, [Congress] endangered not only the
bogus declaratory judgment actions described above, but also
more traditional judgments such as money judgments
recovered by plaintiffs in, e.g., wrongful death actions for the
recovery of damages for the death of their same-sex
(Hawaiian) spouses .... [W]e may hope that the application
of DOMA to judgments will be limited to the 'declaration of
marriage' scenario and not extended to more traditional
judgments. 141
In another article discussing interstate recognition of same-sex domestic
partnerships, Professor Whitten wrote that DOMA may be applicable to
domestic partnerships because they are "based on a relationship treated as a
marriage" to a limited extent. He also stated that DOMA may
137 Borchers, supra note 56, at 182. (He was discussing the situation of a loss of
consortium action which resulted in a money judgment in favor of a person whose same-sex
partner was injured in an accident by a tourist from another state, and the question of whether
that other state had to recognize the judgment.)
138 Borchers, supra note 56, at 183-84.
139 Borchers, supra note 56, at 184.
140 Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 255, 391 (1998).
141 Id.
142 Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-
of-Law Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1235, 1246. This limited extent is a
significant argument for finding that domestic partnerships and civil unions do not fit within
the bounds of DOMA. With marriage comes over one thousand and forty-nine federal and
hundreds of state rights and benefits that are not provided to members of same-sex couples who
are in domestic partnership, reciprocal beneficiary, or civil union relationships. See Cox, supra
note 27. If same-sex couples receive such limited protections of our relationships under these
alternative systems, then it is unfair to bring those relationships within the scope of DOMA
(continued)
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constitutionally permit states to refuse to recognize judgments from other
states, even though it would be a clear exception to the general rule that they
receive the "same effect" in other states as in the rendering state. But while
believing that such a refusal may be constitutional, he questioned whether
DOMA should be interpreted to do so:
Congress may have included more within [DOMA] than is
desirable .... [When discussing an exception from interstate
recognition for a valid money judgment in a wrongful death
action by a same-sex spouse, e]nforcement of the judgment
where the tortfeasor has assets, presumably in the tortfeasor's
home state, may no longer be a matter of right under the
'same effect' command of the implementing statute because
the judgment might be removed from the command by a
broad interpretation of DOMA as applied to judgments.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why Congress would want
to reach such a result, and the better construction of DOMA
would limit its inclusion of judgments to the kind of evil at
which Congress was aiming: a bogus declaratory judgment
action in the state where the same-sex partners are wedded
that is designed to force other states to accept the same-sex
marriage contrary to their laws.
143
Although DOMA includes "judicial proceedings" within its scope, even its
supporters question its wisdom in doing so. Essentially, they argue that
DOMA was unnecessary to permit states to refuse to recognize the marriages
of same-sex couples, since the public policy exception in choice-of-law theory
permits the same result,'" and DOMA was unwise in trying to alter the firmly
established rule providing interstate recognition of judgments.
Numerous policy reasons exist for the "'iron law of full faith and
credit."",141 One reason, expressed in Williams I and other cases, comes from
the purpose of the clause "to make the several states 'integral parts of a single
while also denying those couples the full range of benefits and rights given to marriages.
143 Whitten, supra note 144, at 1249.
144 See Borchers, supra note 56, at 180.
145 Stewart E. Sterk, The Muddy Boundaries Between Res Judicata and Full Faith and
Credit, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 47, 98 (2001) (citing William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of
Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REv. 412 (1994)). Sterk does believe, however, that the
"iron" law is relaxed when a court issues a judgment that controls post-judgment behavior,
such as with injunctions against future activity and modifiable decrees in child support and
custody. Id. at 49-50. Whether he would include adoptions, which create the status of parent-
child both now and in the future, is unclear, but it seems likely that he would not because of the
change of status that occurs at the end of the case and that must be final if the purposes of Full
Faith and Credit are to be obtained. See id. at 60-61.
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nation. ' ' 46 Rather than permitting the country to consist of "a collection of
independent, sovereign states,"147 the clause "was adopted to 'guard the new
political and economic union against the disintegrating influence of
provincialism in jurisprudence.'"148 When Congress exercises its full faith and
credit authority, it should "harmonize with this constitutional principle,"'
' 49
something that DOMA clearly does not do if it were to allow, in this case, the
Florida statute banning adoption by lesbian and gay parents' " to trump the
adoption decree previously granted in California.
Another reason is the "national interest in finality of'judgments: Litigation
must end somewhere."' 5 ' Besides the obvious concern that re-litigation of
cases imposes significant costs and instability for the parties to the litigation,
"the policy is based on the respect due the court that rendered the initial
decision, whose abilities or even integrity might be cast in doubt if other courts
refused to recognize the decisions it reached." 52 As the Supreme Court
recognized:
[The Full Faith and Credit] clause compels that controversies
be stilled so that where a state court has jurisdiction of the
parties and subject matter, its judgment controls in other
states to the same extent as it does in the state where
rendered.... By the constitutional provision for full faith and
credit, the local doctrines of res judicata, speaking generally,
become a part of national jurisprudence ....
Having received a valid, final judgment permitting the adoption of Martha by
Laurie under California law, thatjudgment and the parental status which goes
with it must be final and not subject to relitigation whenever Laurie or Martha
leave California.
146 Id. at 60.
147 See Paige E. Chabora, Congress'Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 604, 647 (1997) (citing Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)); Williams v. North Carolina 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942)
(Williams I).
148 Chabora, supra note 147, at 647 (citing Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-
The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 (1945)).
149 Chabora, supra note 147, at 647.
150 FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002).
'51 Chabora, supra note 147, at 647 (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938)
("It is just as important that there should be an end as that there should be a place to begin
litigation.").
152 Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA, supra note 3, at 15 (quoting LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWs 298-99 (2d ed. 1995)).
153 Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA, supra note 3, at 22 n. 109 (citing Riley v. New York
Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1942)).
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Additionally, enforcement of judgments "coordinates the sovereign
interests of the several states. Each state relinquishes one aspect of its
sovereign power: The right to adjudicate disputes in which courts of a sister
state have already rendered judgment. In return, the state obtains the assurance
that its own judgments will enjoy nationwide force."' 154 By preserving equality
between the states in this manner, "[a]nything taken from a state by way of
freedom to deny faith and credit to law of others is thereby added to the state
by way of a right to exact faith and credit for its own."'15 5 California is entitled
to have its adoption decree recognized in Florida and all other states, because it
must recognize the adoption decrees granted by Florida and the other states.
Only by consistently applying this requirement of full faith and credit is
equality between the states assured. The Defense of Marriage Act should not
be applied to judgments and particularly not to the adoption decree of Martha
by Laurie, if the principles underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause are to
be upheld.
Additionally, DOMA should not apply to Laurie and Ellen's situation
because their domestic partnership, upon which their stepparent adoption rests,
is neither a marriage nor "a relationship ... that is treated as a marriage" in
California. Even were DOMA interpreted to exempt judgments concerning
marriages by same-sex couples from the usual requirements of full faith and
credit, California's domestic partnership statutes and the rights provided by it
do not fall within the scope of DOMA, and thus, Laurie's adoption of Martha
must be recognized.
Having explained that Williams I prevents states, such as Florida in my
hypothetical, to refuse to recognize the adoption decree by Laurie and Ellen
from California, 156 it is important to explain why Williams II also does not
threaten the interstate validity of that decree.
157
The usual avenue for attacking the validity of a judgment, after the time
for appeal has passed, is to challenge whether the original court granting the
judgment had jurisdiction over the lawsuit and the ability to render ajudgment.
This is known as a collateral attack and can be made in a second state against
the judgment from the first state. Professor Whitten provides an excellent
discussion of the bases for such a collateral attack in his article, 58 and I will
not repeat that discussion here.
The success of a collateral attack on an adoption decree is very unlikely in
the usual situation. The adoptive parents usually live in the state where they
seek the adoption, use the statutes of that state or its case precedent to pursue
the adoption, and have a child who is also living in that state. Usually the
154 Sterk, supra note 145, at 75.
155 Chabora, supra note 147, at 648.
156 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams 1).
157 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II).
158 Whitten, supra note 6, at Part III.
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child is either the biological child of one of the parties and already living with
his or her parents, or is a foster child placed by the state in the home of the
adoptive parent(s). Clearly the adoption decree by that state permitting the gay
or lesbian parent(s) to adopt the child is within the jurisdiction of that state's
courts, assuming the lawyers took Civil Procedure in law school and showed
up at the right courthouse. 159 Because the court granting the adoption had
jurisdiction over the parties before the court, attacks against the adoption
decree in other states will not be successful.
Just as strong policy reasons exist for not requiring a married couple to
have their marital status repeatedly questioned or litigated as they move across
the country, even stronger policy reasons support interstate recognition of the
valid, final adoption decrees of one state by its sister states. Perhaps nowhere
is the traditional finality of judgments and interstate recognition of their
validity more important than with adoption. The court that grants the adoption
is recognizing the parental relationship that exists between the parent(s) and
the child(ren). Courts when granting adoptions use the standard of whether the
adoption is in the best interests of the child.16° Having determined that it
would be in the child's best interest to be adopted by the parent or parents, it
would be terrible to have that relationship thrown into jeopardy as the family
moved or traveled across the country. Even more than the importance of
providing stability when recognizing the marriage of two adults is the
importance of providing stability for the child and the family that has been
legally developed by the adoption decree. To permit another state which may
not have allowed that adoption in the first place to refuse to recognize it at a
time when some threat has been made to the child or his or her parents
(because their relationship has been challenged in court) would violate the
Supreme Court's strict adherence to using the Full Faith and Credit Clause'
6 1
to protect judgments from later challenge.
IV. STATES THAT HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER To GIVE
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION TO ADOPTIONS BY GAY OR LESBIAN
PARENTS HAVE RECOGNIZED THE ADOPTIONS
States clearly understand the Constitutional requirement to give Full Faithand 162
and Credit to the adoption decrees of lesbian and gay parents. In three
recent settings, state courts and legislatures analyzed the issue and determined
that these adoption decrees, that are valid and final in one state, must be
recognized by all others.
159 Whitten, supra note 6, at Part II.A.
160 See Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and
Enforceability of Visitation Orders for Former Parents under Uniform Adoption Act, 51 FLA.
L. REV. 89, 93 (1999); Polikoff, supra note 121, at 733.
161 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
162 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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A. Starr v. Erez
In this case, S.E., the biological mother of her same-sex partner's adoptive
child, tried to convince the North Carolina courts to refuse to recognize the
second-parent adoption decree that Washington State granted to her former
partner. 63 After the parties separated, S.E. moved to Georgia and then North
Carolina, leaving full responsibility for their child with A.S., the adoptive
mother. She then tried to use North Carolina's anti-marriage statute as a basis
for declaring the adoption to be invalid in North Carolina.16 After losing at
the trial court level, S.E. pursued the issue in the Court of Appeals. According
to Kate Kendall, Executive Director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights,
S.E.'s suit was unprecedented because:
[Aldoptions always have been sacrosanct and recognized in
every state, even if a state does not approve second-parent
adoptions for its residents . . . [and because] S.E. is
attempting to use an anti-gay law, which has nothing to do
with adoption, to destroy very hard fought rights and
protections for our families.1
65
Professor Nancy Polikoff discussed Starr v. Erez, and the argument that
the North Carolina court should not recognize a second-parent adoption by a
lesbian parent that had been granted in Washington State. Professor Polikoff
explained:
[T]he status of parent and child, once created in one state,
must be accepted by all states and by the federal government.
Although North Carolina courts are not supportive of lesbian
and gay parents, in one case a judge rejected an argument that
a second-parent adoption granted in Washington state should
not be recognized in North Carolina because it was against
public policy in that state .... 1
163 See Lesbian Attempts to Use Anti-Gay Law to Invalidate Second-Parent Adoption,
Apr. 24, 2000, available at http://www.nclrights.org/releases/nocar.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2003).
16 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2002) which reads "[m]arriages, whether
created by common law contracted, or performed outside of North Carolina, between
individuals of the same gender are not valid in North Carolina.").
16 Id.
16 Polikoff, supra note 121, at 735 (citing Starr v. Erez, 97 CVD 624 (Durham County,
N.C. General Court of Justice 1997)). The trial judge refused to dismiss the custody petition
filed by Starr, the nonbiological mother, and set the case for trial. Erez filed an interlocutory
appeal to the North Carliina Court of Appeals which was dismissed as premature. Id. at 735
n.113.
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Despite the argument that North Carolina's anti-marriage statute provided a
basis for denying A.S.'s parental rights under the adoption decree, the North
Carolina courts found that A.S.'s parental rights established in the Washington
adoption decree had to be recognized in North Carolina during a custody
dispute between the parents.
B. Mississippi Statute Not Passed
Professor Polikoff also observed that Mississippi has strong case law and
statutes that disfavor the marriages and parenting of same-sex couples. In
1997, Mississippi adopted its version of an anti-marriage statute.
16 7
Mississippi also disfavors custody by gay or lesbian parents upon divorce.' 
68
Additionally, no evidence exists of an openly gay or lesbian parent adopting in
Mississippi or of an openly gay or lesbian couple jointly adopting in the
state. 169 In 2000, Mississippi prohibited "adoption by couples of the same
gender.' 170 But Polikoff notes: "Although Mississippi recently enacted a
prohibition on adoption by same-sex couples in that state, the legislature
rejected a portion of the original proposal that would have denied recognition
to such adoptions granted in other states."'
7
'1
The proposed legislation was not passed because it would have denied
interstate recognition of otherwise valid, final adoption decrees, even though
gay men and lesbians were not permitted to adopt in Mississippi under its new
statute.172 This shows the recognition by the Mississippi legislature that suchan option was not permitted under the U.S. Constitution.
C. Serenna D. Russell v. Joan C. Bridgens
In this case, the Supreme Court of Nebraska addressed the issue of
whether a 1997 Pennsylvania adoption decree by two lesbians was entitled to
full faith and credit in Nebraska under the U.S. Constitution. 173 Joan Bridgens
167 Polikoff, supra note 121, at 750 (citing MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (2002) which
reads: "Any marriage between persons of the same gender is prohibited and null and void from
the beginning. Any marriage between persons of the same gender that is valid in another
jurisdiction does not constitute a legal or valid marriage in Mississippi.").
168 Polikoff, supra note 121, at 750 (citing Weigland v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581
(Miss. 1999)).
169 Polikoff, supra note 121, at 750.
170 Id. (citing Miss. CODE. ANN. § 93-17-3(2) which reads: "Adoption by couples of the
same gender is prohibited.").
171 Polikoff, supra note 121, at 735 (citing Miss. H.B. 49 (introduced Jan. 12,2000, died
on calendar Mar. 16, 2000)).
172 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3.
173 Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002).
173 Id. at 58.
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adopted a minor child in Pennsylvania in September 1996.174 In December
1997, Bridgens and her partner, Serenna Russell, jointly adopted the same
child in a coparent adoption. 75 A certified copy of the 1997 adoption decree
was part of the record before the Nebraska courts, although the petition to
adopt was not. 176 The trial court acknowledged that "[tihe certified decree
expressly states that 'all requirements of the Acts of Assembly have been
fulfilled and complied with."",177 Bridgens and Russell lived together and
raised the child together until August 1999.178 Then Russell and the child, who
had been living with Bridgens in Germany, returned to the U.S. while
Bridgens remained in Germany. 179 In November 2000, Russell filed a petition
to establish custody and support for the child in Douglas County, Nebraska. 80
After answering and petitioning for custody and support herself, Bridgens
filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the 1997 adoption was
invalid under Pennsylvania law. In July 2001, the trial court granted the
motion, reasoning that "Pennsylvania law required Bridgens to terminate her
parental rights prior to the 1997 adoption and... 'it appears to the Court this
was not done and [Russell] has not offered evidence to the contrary.""10 82 In a
motion for reconsideration, the district court "clarified that because the
Pennsylvania statutory requirements for adoption were not met, the
Pennsylvania court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the adoption and
that therefore, the adoption was not entitled to full faith and credit under the
U.S. Constitution."'183 Russell appealed and-the Supreme Court moved the case
to its own docket. 84
Professor Whitten discusses the Court's opinion in detail in this issue,'
85
and I will not repeat that discussion here. But I will highlight some of the
main points of the majority and the concurring opinions. The Supreme Court
made it clear that a final judgment from a sister state must be recognized in
Nebraska. 1
86
"A judgment rendered in a sister state court which had jurisdiction is to be
given full faith and credit and has the same validity and effect in Nebraska as









183 Id. at 58-9
194 Id. at 59.
185 See Whitten, supra note 6.
186 Russell, 647 N.W.2d at 59.
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in the state rendering judgment."' 87
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution8"
prohibits a Nebraska court from reviewing the merits of a
judgment rendered in a sister state, but a foreign judgment
can be collaterally attacked by evidence that the rendering
court was without jurisdiction over the parties or the subject
matter.189
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the question of whether the
Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction was dependent on Pennsylvania law.' 90 As
the one challenging the Pennsylvania adoption decree, Bridgens would have to
show that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.' 9' But, as the Supreme
Court also noted:
The record before us, however, contains only the 1997
Pennsylvania adoption decree which affirmatively alleges on
its face that it was decreed in conformance with Pennsylvania
law. There is no evidence in the record establishing that the
necessary consents were not included with the petition for
adoption or that Bridgens did not... relinquish her parental
rights.
192
Thus, the Court found that Bridgens did not meet her burden for
summary judgment and the trial court erred by granting her motion. 93 Thecourt then remanded the case to the trial court. It also stated,
[f]or the benefit of the parties and the district court, we note
that the legal issue of whether compliance with the statutory
requirements of the Pennsylvania adoption act is an aspect of
subject matter jurisdiction is an issue we view to be
significantly dependent upon the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania's resolution of the pending appeals in In re
Adoption ofR.B.F.,' 94 and In reAdoption of C.C.G.19. .... '9'
Decided after the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Bridgens, the
187 Id.
188 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
1s9 Russell, 647 N.W. 2d at 59.
190 Russell, 647 N.W, 2d at 59.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Russell, 647 N.W. 2d at 59.
194 In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
195 In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
196 Russell, 647 N.W.2d at 60.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania adoption statutes did
not expressly permit second-parent adoptions (whereby the legal or biological
parent retains parental status and his or her partner also becomes a legal parent
through adoption).19 7 But the legislature had provided for situations when a
parent can retain his or her parental status while also consenting to the
adoption of the child by his or her partner.' 98 The Court noted that:
There is no language in the Adoption Act precluding two
unmarried same-sex partners (or unmarried heterosexual
partners) from adopting a child who had no legal parents. It
is therefore absurd to prohibit their adoptions merely because
their children were either the biological or adopted children
of one of the partners prior to the filing of the adoption
petition.' 99
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the cases to the trial courts for
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the same-sex couples could
demonstrate good cause, by clear and convincing evidence, why the
requirement for relinquishing parental ights before adoption was either
fulfilled or unnecessary in the two 
cases.
Given the Pennsylvania court's determination that adoptions by same-sex
couples were permitted under the Pennsylvania statutes, on remand, the
Nebraska trial court should determine that the Pennsylvania adoption decree of
Bridgens and Russell was valid and therefore entitled to Full Faith and Credit
in Nebraska.
Importantly, nowhere in its decision did the Supreme Court of Nebraska
consider local Nebraska law or the so-called Defense of Marriage Act in
deciding whether the Pennsylvania adoption decree had to be recognized in
Nebraska.20 1 This was true even though that same Court had previously held,
in In re Adoption of Luke, that step-parent adoptions were limited to married
couples in Nebraska, and thus unavailable to same-sex couples.20 2
Additionally, the Nebraska constitution had been recently amended by ballot
initiative, on November 5, 2002, to limit marriage to "a male and a female
person. 20 3 Despite these expressions of local policy, the Nebraska court
understood that the validity of the Pennsylvania adoption decree in Nebraska
was dependent on Pennsylvania law, not Nebraska law.
197 In re Adoption of R.B.F. & R.C.F. 803 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2002).
198 Id. at 1202-03.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 1203.
201 Russell, 647 N.W.2d at 56.
202 640 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Neb. 2002).
203 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Specific Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Laws in the
U.S., at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/marriagemap0601.pdg (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
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In a separate concurrence, Justice Gerrard wrote:
I write separately, not because of a petty disagreement with
the rationale of the majority opinion or as a mere intellectual
exercise, but because the record reflects that the minor child's
best interests have needlessly remained unaddressed while
these proceedings continue on. The minor child affected by
these proceedings has not had court-ordered visitation with
Serenna D. Russell (a primary caregiver in his life) for several
months, nor have the custody and visitation issues been
addressed as they should have.2°
He believed that the district court should have provided interim
arrangements for visitation with whichever party did not have temporary
custody.20 5 "So long as the ultimate disposition of this case remains uncertain,
a temporary order of visitation should be entered that is consistent with the
best interests of the child."2°6 Rather than leaving the child in limbo for
several months while the appeal and remand were resolved, the trial court
should have protected the child's relationship with one of his legal parents
during the interim.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, in our hypothetical situation, Laurie and Ellen should not let the fear
that their adoption decree, valid and final in California, might not be
recognized in Florida to determine whether they move their family to Florida.
They may want to consider the negative impact of Florida law on their day-to-
day lives when making this decision. 20 7 However, they do not have to fear that
their parental relationships with Martha will be questioned in Florida. Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause 208 of the U.S. Constitution, Florida must
recognize both Laurie and Ellen as Martha's legal parents.
204 Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Neb. 2002).
205 Id. at 66.
206 Id. at 66.
207 See Adams, supra note 21.
208 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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